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PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP: AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT 
ARYEH NEIER* 
As a distinguished scholar-practitioner, Harold Hongju Koh came to his 
post as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights with the best possible 
preparation.  His performance fulfilled the high expectations of proponents for 
human rights.  Though I count myself among his many admirers, I devote this 
Essay to a couple of points on which I take issue with the views he expresses. 
The first has to do with the question of early warning.  I touch on this only 
briefly because it is the subject of a new book by Samantha Power, A Problem 
From Hell.1  It is not possible here to do justice to the issues Ms. Power 
discusses in her excellent book on the American response to genocide.  Suffice 
it to say that the evidence Ms. Power collects about several recent genocides—
the Cambodian holocaust of the mid-1970’s, the Iraqi “Anfal” in which Kurds 
were slaughtered in 1987-88 at the end of the Iraq-Iran war, the Bosnian 
disaster of 1992-95 and the Rwandan genocide of 1994—is at odds with 
Harold Hongju Koh’s view that the issue is “getting the right information into 
the right hands at the right moment, before large-scale abuses actually take 
place, in time to generate the political will necessary to head off the explosion 
of atrocities.”2  Unfortunately, it appears the problem in responding to 
genocide is not an absence of information or the question of who has the 
information on a timely basis.  Nor is political will to respond generated 
spontaneously by getting these things to come together.  The Bosnian case is 
the most glaring example.  Far from a shortage of information, Americans and 
everyone else were saturated with news coverage of what was taking place.  
Thanks to satellite communications, the siege of Sarajevo led the nightly news 
almost every evening for an extended period.  After a few weeks in which their 
existence was concealed, journalists such as Roy Gutman and Ed Vulliamy 
ensured that we knew all about death camps such as Omarska and Keratem.  
Mass rape was widely reported.  Yet it took more than three years, close to 
200,000 deaths and the forcible expulsion of about two million people from 
their homes and communities until the United States and its NATO allies 
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acted.  Leadership was the missing element.  Had there been leadership, 
enough information was known in good time about Cambodia, about the Kurds 
in Iraq and about Rwanda so that action could have been taken.  Without it, 
nothing was done. 
Mr. Koh writes that “if there is reason to believe that atrocities are about to 
happen, the United States should engage in preventive diplomacy—by which I 
mean diplomacy backed by force . . . .”3  I agree.  But as I am sure Mr. Koh 
would concur, such diplomacy can only be effective if the threat of force is 
credible.  At the time the Rwandan genocide took place in 1994, the war in 
Bosnia and the news of carnage there had been underway for two years.  I am 
skeptical that diplomatic efforts by the United States or the European powers 
could have succeeded in preventing the Rwandan genocide at that point.  Their 
unreadiness to intervene forcefully to halt a genocide in the center of Europe 
made it unlikely they would do what was required to prevent a genocide in the 
center of Africa.  This was well understood by the Rwandan government 
officials who planned and organized the genocide.  As it was, the United States 
led the effort in the United Nations Security Council to evacuate United 
Nations (U.N.) troops stationed in Rwanda.  This was not a sign that our 
government lacked information; rather, it suggested awareness that the 
situation was deteriorating rapidly and reflected a desire to avoid an 
engagement that might lead to deeper involvement.  The Rwandan genocide 
began just six months after eighteen American soldiers were killed in 
Mogadishu.4  Eagerness to avoid a repetition of such an event seems to have 
been the main concern of the United States.  To back up preventive diplomacy 
with a credible threat of force would have required leadership by a President 
who gave higher priority to stopping genocide. 
The second point on which I take issue involves China.  Mr. Koh writes 
that: “In the end, we delude ourselves if we believe that a country as large and 
powerful as China will change its conduct simply because one other country 
happens to impose unilateral economic sanctions upon them.”5  I acknowledge 
that there is only scant evidence to contradict Mr. Koh on this point.  One 
reason for this lack of evidence is that not much by way of economic sanctions 
has ever been imposed on China.  Hence, the question of whether such 
sanctions would work is largely a matter of speculation.  The same may be 
said, however, for Mr. Koh’s contrary proposition.  He states that: “The only 
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way to bring about a long-term change in Chinese behavior is to organize an 
ongoing, sustained, multilateral and bipartisan engagement with China that 
repeatedly emphasizes the communal values of the global system . . . .”6  I am 
uncertain whether Mr. Koh would agree that the engagement that has been 
underway with China meets this standard.  What can be said, however, is that it 
has been sustained, multilateral and bipartisan—though perhaps lacking in an 
emphasis on values—but there is no evidence that it has produced any change 
in Chinese conduct.  Certainly, it has not modified Chinese treatment of 
dissent.  As Beijing’s response to the Falun Gong movement indicates, its 
conduct has not been modified in the slightest by engagement.7 
It should be noted that the Chinese government has manifested its own 
belief in the efficacy of economic sanctions by imposing them on governments 
and corporations that criticize its human rights practices.  Over the years, it has 
played the United States against Europe, taking its business away from Airbus 
when Europe was too outspoken about human rights and from Boeing when it 
was our government that caused annoyance.  In 1996, China threatened to take 
its business away from the General Electric Company unless a subsidiary, 
NBC, issued an apology for the comments of a broadcaster covering the 
Olympics who pointed out—without providing any details—that the country 
had human rights problems.8  The apology was given.  A few months earlier, 
Beijing cancelled a visit by German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and 
threatened to take its business elsewhere because the Bundestag adopted a 
resolution critical of China’s policies in Tibet. 
President George H.W. Bush imposed sanctions on China in 1989 
following the June 3-4 crackdown on protests in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square.9  
Those sanctions—which did not include denial of most favored nation status 
(MFN)—were violated by the Administration that imposed them almost before 
the ink on the declaration announcing them was dry.  A debate on MFN began 
as the anniversary of the crackdown approached.  By coincidence, the date for 
the annual presidential waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 
Trade Act happened to be June 3.  That timing was a key factor in setting off 
the debates about MFN. 
Each year for a few years, as June 3 approached, China released a few well 
known political prisoners and announced some other measures intended to 
show that its human rights practices were improving, such as ending martial 
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law in Lhasa, Tibet and its commencement of negotiations with the 
International Committee of the Red Cross to allow the Swiss organization to 
visit its prisons.  Then, as Mr. Koh points out, President Clinton announced in 
1994 that he was delinking trade and human rights.10  Thereafter, he would 
issue the annual waiver required under Jackson-Vanik without regard to the 
human rights situation.  China responded by rearresting its most prominent 
political prisoner, Wei Jingsheng,—who had been released the previous year 
when China was trying to persuade the International Olympics Committee to 
designate Beijing as the site for the 2000 Olympics.  Also, China ended its 
discussions with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) about 
access to its prisons.  This is what I have in mind when I refer to “scant 
evidence” that sanctions, or at least the prospect of sanctions, promote change.  
Admittedly, it is not much to go on.  But it is all we have. 
There is, of course, substantial evidence that countries much smaller than 
China can be changed by economic sanctions for human rights abuses.  The 
best examples are South Africa, where the U.S. Congress imposed sanctions in 
October 1986 over President Ronald Reagan’s veto;11 and Poland, where the 
Reagan Administration unilaterally imposed sanctions following the 
declaration of martial law by the regime of General Wojciech Jaruzelski on 
December 13, 1981.  The latter is a particularly instructive example because 
the Reagan Administration carefully calibrated the sanctions, modifying them 
as Warsaw made improvements and finally ending them in February 1987 
when the last political prisoners were released.12  And, more recently, there is 
the example of Yugoslavia.  It is hard to say exactly what part was played by 
economic sanctions in the electoral defeat of Slobodan Milosevic in September 
2000 and his overthrow a couple of weeks later when he refused to concede 
defeat.  All that can be said was that the desire by Serbs to be free of the 
sanctions was one of a number of contributing factors. 
The approach I favor for China—now, I regret to say, politically 
irrelevant—was  embodied in legislation that Congress considered and adopted 
in 1992.  Inspired by the Reagan Administration’s way of dealing with Poland 
after martial law, it would have imposed tariffs selectively on China.  These 
would have been adjusted according to the way the human rights situation 
developed.  Congress adopted this approach, but we have no way of knowing 
whether it would have worked because President George H.W. Bush vetoed it 
on September 28, 1992.  The House of Representatives voted to override, but 
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the Senate vote of 59 to 40 fell short of the two-thirds majority required to 
enact the measure.  Then-candidate William Jefferson Clinton denounced the 
President, his opponent in the elections that November, for “coddling tyrants” 
from Belgrade to Beijing.  Upon election to office, however, President Clinton 
declined to intervene significantly in what Belgrade was doing to Bosnia until 
another three years had elapsed, and, in the interim, ended all efforts to 
influence Beijing’s behavior by threats of economic sanctions. 
Though Clinton’s policies towards Belgrade and Beijing, as well as his 
policy toward Kigali, leave me unenthusiastic about his overall human rights 
record, I readily acknowledge that it had its attractive features.  At the top of 
the list, I place his policy towards Kosovo which represented a determination 
to ensure that Milosevic would not be permitted to do again what he had done 
to Bosnia; and the designation first of John Shattuck and then of Harold 
Hongju Koh to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights.  My 
long-term colleague from our days when we both served on the staff of the 
American Civil Liberties Union in the 1970’s, Mr. Shattuck served, not always 
comfortably, during the period in which the policies involving trade with 
China unhampered by human rights considerations, non-intervention in 
Rwanda and greatly delayed intervention in Bosnia were formed and 
implemented.  Mr. Koh’s service covered the latter Clinton years when what I 
consider the more affirmative action toward Kosovo was the highlight of the 
Administration’s policy on human rights. 
As I feel certain Mr. Koh would agree, questions of the magnitude of 
relations with China or military intervention cannot be resolved by an Assistant 
Secretary of State.  They take place in the context of a political process and 
must be decided by the country’s political leader, the President of the United 
States.  An Assistant Secretary of State can contribute to the process by 
ensuring that the right information is available at the right time, but only the 
President can supply the leadership that Mr. Koh refers to as “political will.”13  
It does not detract from what Harold Hongju Koh achieved, nor from what his 
predecessor, John Shattuck, did when he held the office of Assistant Secretary 
of State for Human Rights, to point out that the President they served was 
flawed. 
 
 13. Koh, supra note 2, at 323. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
410 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:405 
 
